The Use of Animals in Biomedical Research Essay Example for Free

The Use of Animals in Biomedical Research EssayThere is a big issue on the use of animals for biomedical research (i.e., research d single for the understanding and promotion mainly of merciful macrocosms life. Such would include, but not limited to, medical conceptuality and testing, formulation and testing of hypotheses about diseases, surgical experiments, testing of various consumer goods for safety, and psychological experimentations). At least up to the register time, animals atomic number 18 still widely apply for research. In an estimate by Barbara Orlans (2001, 400), there are like 50 to100 million animals being used for research annually. Nevertheless, with an increasing awareness on the complexness of animal psyche and the increased voice that animal rights advocates project, the chasteity of such research (along with the separate uses that animals require) has been put into question. In a Dutch animal military commission hearing on the use of animals for c ancer medical testing, for example, a woman who is terminally ill due to cancer stepped forward and said that she would rather separate than have an other(a) animal take over painlessly just for her cure.Human beings are beginning to be acutely aware of such experimentations and unalike sentiments and ideas have been brought to the core. Now, amidst the close unending debate on the use of animals for biomedical research, I would want to first, present the philosophical debate on this issue then second, present my opinion on it. To be able to accomplish this goal, I would first present the debate amidst Carl Cohen and Bernard Rollin. Afterwards, I will present what I say is a middle position amidst the two.The Cohen-Rollin Debate A representative debate on this issue would be the debate between Carl Cohen and Bernard Rollin. Basically, the two are debating on the clean-living status of animals. Allow me to present a summary of the points of these two philosophers. Carl Cohen, a speciesist, says that animals do not have rights and that animal experimentation should go on. A speciesist (2002, 303) is someone who says that our species, i.e., the sympathetic species, gives us all the moral rights that we have. That ultimately, what births us different, and hence rules on homophile experimentation are different, is the fact that we belong to human kind. As such, humankind cannot just be experimented on but would need precautions like informed consent measurement of risk the prior and post paygrade of the research using the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice etcetera. Hence, because we are humans, we have all the rights and privileges that we know we have. Now, the next question that we may have, which Cohen answers, is what makes us humans in the first take aim? For Cohen, the answer is pretty simple. We are human beings because we have moral capacities which animals do not have. These moral capacities refer to the aptit ude of human beings in applying an abstract moral rule on an act has capabilities to make moral claims has the capacity to comprehend rules of duty the capability for self-legislation and are members of communities governed by moral rules (2002, 300-302).These moral capacities would then make human beings are confident of understanding conceptual principles of morality (like for example, do good to others, or do not do actions that would purposely harm other human beings) and apply such to individual human actions. Now because of this capacity, human beings have the capacity for self-restraint. They do not need others (presuming that they are already deep down the age of reason, i.e., mature enough to do these tasks) to restrain them from harming their fellows.Nor would they need others to goad them to do acts that are praiseworthy. As such, human beings could legislate themselves, i.e., govern their own actions. Now, because of this, human beings could very well belong to a fami liarity of other human beings who are capable of the same moral capacities as he is. And his belonging to this community is of the nature that rules and laws are there to minimally guide human interaction. They are not there to govern each single action of the human being.This would esteem that human beings, on the most part, are free on how they interact with each other. She/he is free provided that her/his actions are responsible actions, i.e., actions that the human being may be made accountable for. Now, these moral capacities make human beings capable of rights. Rights basically refer to claims, or potential claims, at bottom a community of moral agents (2002, 300). The human capacity for understanding concepts and applying such concepts in his dealings and acts with each other makes the human being capable of making such claims. At this point, Cohen says that these rights cannot overcompensate to animals for the simple reason that animals do not have these moral capacities we have mentioned. They are incapable of understanding, i.e., of moral reasoning, and such, all the other moral capacities could not be attributed to them. We have to state at this point that for Cohen, even psychologically disabled or comatosed human beings retain these rights plainly because they belong to the same kind. In one way or another, such human beings seem to ride on the capabilities of other human beings. Hence, for Cohen, animal experimentation (of course not withstanding useless cruelness to animals) should go on for the good of the human race since we could not talk of violation of any rights in the first place since animals do not have rights.Bernard Rollin (2001, 418) responds to Cohens arguments by saying that it might be true that rights started from humans, but, it does not mean that such rights should remain among humans. He made an analogy on the plot of land of chess. It might be true that chess was made initially for Persian royalty, nevertheless, the game started to have a life of its own and as such, it is not anymore restricted by the original makers of it. The same may be said about rights that human beings made and sorted out for themselves.What would stop the Bill of Rights from being applied to animals if sociological evolution would lead to such? Plainly, there is no guarantee that such rights would have to remain and be applicable only to its sources. In one way or another, Rollin seems to allude to the Ricoeurean hermeneutics on the life of the text, on the unstoppable and unfigurable refiguration of the text. Now, this may be true if the Bill of Rights could plainly be called a text, as a product of a social contract, but probably not if these rights are perceived in a naturalistic way.Rollin goes on to spread out his basic stand there seems to be no morally relevant inconsistency between humans and vertebrate animals to include all humans within the full scope of moral concern and yet deny such moral status to the anim als (2001, 413). Then, he goes on to define morally relevant difference it is a difference that rationally justifies treating them differently in some way that bears moral weight (2001, 413). Hence, Rollin says that if two students coming from two different races and having two different eye colors would have the same class standing, they would be given the same grade.Their differences cannot be considered as relevant for the teachers act of grading. Now, Rollin states that the differences between humans and other vertebrates are not relevant because aside from the fact that both feel pain, both also have interests that must be respected. True, human interests may be different from animal interests, but the fact remains that both are interest-driven.Animal interests are violated when they are made to suffer when social animals are kept in isolation when burrowing animals are kept in steel cages etcetera. Rollin also argues that there seems to be no difference between intellectually disabled humans and many animals, and hence, if consent is called for when experimenting on these human beings, such would also be called for when doing animal experimentation.The Middle Position Cohen is clear on his position we are not violating anything when animals are used in experimenting since these experiments are needed for the human good. Rollin, on the other hand, is on the soft position that animals and humans are not relevantly different, and hence, the rights accorded to human beings in research ought to be the same rights given to other vertebrates. For Rollin, simply, animals should be treated as humans particularly when it comes to biomedical research.Now, the consequences of their positions seem to be clear Cohens position is a defense of the status quo, while Rollins position implies that medical ciphers on human experimentation like the Nuremberg Code should all be extended to vertebrate animals. I would say that though it is true that certain animals exhibit c haracteristics that are almost like that of humans (like the great apes, for example), still, Cohen is right in saying that rationality as it is present in humanity makes humans largely different from the other animals (just look at all the human civilizations and histories which even the most intelligent animals are incapable of, and as such, I find it hard to understand wherefore Rollin says that the difference between animals and humans are not relevant differences), and as such, things that apply to human beings cannot all be applied to animals, like the medical code of ethics on human experimentation, for example. Such an application leads to difficult consequences.For one, such would necessitate the experimenter to gain the subjects consent. How do we get an animals consent? What standard should we use? Should we ask the owners? How about animals that do not have owners? Next would be the issue of informed consent. Again, who do we inform and whose key signature do we get? I would say that the present trend in animal experimentation in at least some parts of the arena is a sober middle ground since at least in ten developed countries, legal measures have been passed regarding the control of pain and suffering of testing ground animals.Many other countries also have legislation on the inspection of research and breeding facilities, requirement for daily care, the checking on the competency and the licenses of qualified persons who shell out the experiment, the monitoring by an independent committee, the searching for available alternatives for the experiment, and the creation of ethical criteria for decision making (Orlans 2001, 405).These legal concerns are far from the contents of the Code of Nuremberg or the Helsinki Declaration, nevertheless, they express a concern for the animals who also feels pain like human beings, and who also deserve a sort of concern from us. Hence, animal experimentation should not be stopped but legal constraints distinc t from that of human beings have to be put on such experiments since animals are also capable of pain and have interests.REFERENCE LISTCohen, Carl. The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, in Ethical Issues in Biotechnology, ed by Richard Sherlock and can Murrey, 299-308. Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.Orlans, Barbara. History and Ethical Regulation of Animal Experimentation An International Perspective, in A Companion to Bioethics, ed by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, 399-410. Massachusetts, Oxford, and Victoria Blackwell, 2001.Rollin, Bernard. The Moral lieu of Animals and Their Use as Experimental Subjects, in A Companion to Bioethics, ed by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, 411-422. Massachusetts, Oxford, and Victoria Blackwell, 2001.